We define a logic D capable of expressing dependence of a variable on designated variables only. Thus D has similar goals to the Henkin quantifiers of [4] and the independence friendly logic of [6] that it much resembles. The logic D achieves these goals by realizing the desired dependence declarations of variables on the level of atomic formulas. By [3] and [17], ability to limit dependence relations between variables leads to existential second order expressive power. Our D avoids some difficulties arising in the original independence friendly logic from coupling the dependence declarations with existential quantifiers. As is the case with independence friendly logic, truth of D is definable inside D. We give such a definition for D in the spirit of [11, 2] and [1] .
Introduction
This paper is an attempt to make the independence friendly logic of [6] and the related compositional semantics in [8] more transparent.
Consider the sentence ∀x 1 . . . ∀x n (∃y/x 2 ) ψ(x 1 , . . . , x n , y).
This sentence says that if you choose elements x 1 , . . . , x n , then on the basis of just x 1 and x 3 , . . . , x n I can choose an element y so that ψ(x 1 , . . . , x n , y). The formal semantics says that y can be chosen as a function of x 1 , x 3 , . . . , x n . Now arguably the notation (∃y/x 2 ) mentions exactly the wrong thing. It expresses that I don't need x 2 for choosing y; what it should be saying is rather that I can choose y using the other chosen elements. In other words, the hidden fact behind the quantifier is that there is a y determined by x 1 , x 3 , . . . , x n , such that ψ(x 1 , . . . , x n , y).
For this and other reasons, one of us (Väänänen) proposed a different syntax which detaches the dependence from the quantifier and expresses it as a separate clause. In this paper we develop this idea. Our quantifiers will be just the classical ∀ and ∃, but we introduce new atomic formulas, called dependence formulas, as follows. When n 2, the atomic formula =(x 1 , . . . , x n−1 , x n ) (2) $ The authors thank The Newton Institute. The manuscript was finalized while the authors were visitors at the institute as part of the program ''Logic and Algorithms '' 2006 . The first author thanks the Philosophy Department of Princeton University where a preliminary manuscript was prepared.
will have the intuitive meaning x n is determined by x 1 , . . . , x n−1 .
(3)
We will call the resulting formalism dependence logic. The semantics for the dependence formulas seems to us more intuitive than the semantics for slash quantifiers (1) . One reason for this may be that natural languages have expressions that are like dependence formulas, but to the best of our knowledge they rarely or never have expressions that behave like (∃x/y) or (∃x\y) (see (6) ).
Most of this paper will recast facts about IF-logic within dependence logic. At the end we make some remarks about expressing dependence in English.
An elementary presentation of dependence logic has appear in [16] .
At least three different syntaxes
Before we go to details, we need to mention a slight glitch in the definition of the semantics in [6] . Page 365 describes a semantics in terms of Skolem functions. In effect, the sentence (1) above is defined to be true if and only if a function F exists so that ∀x 1 . . . ∀x n ψ(x 1 , . . . , x n , F (x 1 , x 3 , . . . , x n )) (4) is true. Page 364 describes a game-theoretic semantics: Player ∀ chooses elements a 1 , . . . , a n to assign to the variables x 1 , . . . , x n , and then player ∃ chooses an element b to assign to y. Player ∃ wins if the assigned elements make ψ(x 1 , . . . , x n , y) true. The sentence (1) is defined to be true if and only if player ∃ has a winning strategy that chooses b as a function of all previously chosen elements except the one chosen for x 2 .
For the sentence (1) these two conditions are obviously equivalent; player ∃ can take the function F from the first definition as a winning strategy in the second, and vice versa. But they can come apart if the quantifier prefix contains two or more existential quantifiers. A Skolem function for the second existential quantifier will never have the variable from the first existential quantifier as one of its arguments, because skolemising removes all the existentially quantified variables. But in the game semantics there is no reason why player ∃ should not use her second choice as a function of her first choice (unless the quantifier explicitly forbids this).
The quantifier notation (∃y/∀x) of [6] strongly suggests that the author intended the Skolem function semantics throughout. Hintikka has confirmed this orally and in several later writings, for example page 63f of [6] and page 413 of [7] . From the game-theoretic point of view it is more natural to allow strategies to depend on previous moves of either player; it certainly leads to a cleaner compositional semantics too. So following [8, 15] we adopt the game-theoretic semantics for IF-logic, rather than the Skolem function semantics. One should bear this in mind when comparing our languages with Hintikka's. Now consider the sentence
which is one of a number of similar sentences considered in [10] . The sentence is always true. If the domain contains more than one element, then when player ∃ chooses a disjunct at ∨, she looks to see whether the elements a 0 and a 2 chosen for x 0 and x 2 are equal or unequal. If unequal, she chooses the left disjunct and wins. If equal, she chooses the right; then she chooses a 1 as a function of a 2 , namely a 1 = a 2 , and again she wins. (So she uses the ∨ to signal to herself at the ∃.) Translating into dependence formulas, we want to express that x 1 can be chosen as a function of x 2 . But x 2 is not mentioned anywhere
The moral is that we cannot expect a compositional translation from IF-logic to dependence-logic.
To compare the two logics it will be helpful to introduce a third kind of logic. The quantifier
will mean that y can be chosen as a function of x 1 , . . . , x n . The game-theoretic semantics is easy to write down: a strategy for player ∃ at this quantifier must express y as a function of x 1 , . . . , x n . We can do the same for universal quantifiers. (Our notation follows Hintikka [7] . But be warned that he is talking Skolem functions, not games; so his formula means something a little different from ours.) Let us call the resulting logic backslash-logic. Now sentences of IF-logic do translate into sentences of backslash-logic, and vice versa, though again the translations are not compositional. Given an IF-sentence φ, we look at each subformula occurrence of the form
and we list as z 1 , . . . , z k all the variables z such that (i) the subformula occurrence is within the scope of a quantifier (∃z . . .) or (∀z . . .), and (ii) z is not one of y, x 1 , . . . , x n . Then we replace the subformula by
Doing this with every quantifier occurrence in φ, the result is a backslash-logic sentence φ . One easily checks that the game conditions for φ to be true (resp. false) are exactly the same as those for φ to be true (resp. false). The translation in the other direction, from backslash-logic to IF-logic, goes just the same way. There are compositional translations between backslash-logic and dependence-logic-though we will have to check this in detail later (see Proposition 3). Namely:
And conversely:
To illustrate, we translate the sentence (5) first into backslash-logic: (11) and then into dependence-logic:
If this sentence seems less paradoxical than (5), this suggests that the move to dependence-logic is going to be helpful for intuition.
Assume for the moment that our formal semantics will confirm the translation between backslash-logic and dependencelogic. Then it follows that dependence-logic has, on sentences, the same expressive power as IF-logic and hence the same expressive power of existential second order logic. (More precisely, for every sentence of dependence-logic there is an existential second order sentence that has exactly the same models, and vice versa.) In particular dependence-logic is in the strongest terms non-axiomatizable. Not only is there no arithmetically complete definable axiom-system, but to axiomatize this logic completely one would have to solve a whole range of questions undecidable in set theory, such as the Continuum Hypothesis. In other words, any axiomatization will be open ended, subject to endless future extensions, like the ZFC axioms for set theory. We will see that another characteristic feature of dependence-logic is that it does not have a negation in the classical sense. It is not only that some new sentences do not have a negation. The failure of negation is so complete that not a single sentence containing a non-eliminable occurrence of a dependence formula has a negation.
The reason for these consequences of giving the said meaning to =(x 1 , x 2 ) is that the ability to talk about arbitrary functional dependence between x 1 and x 2 allows us to refer to the surrounding mathematical world. For example, we can ask whether there is a one-one correspondence between two unary predicates. Being thus able to talk about cardinalities, we can talk about well-orderings and thereby about transitive models of set theory.
The interpretation of dependence formulas
The sentence x n is determined by x 1 , . . . , x n−1 is meaningless if the variables x 1 , . . . , x n stand for particular things. For example is 5 dependent on 2 and ω? This way lies nonsense.
The proper setting for using this notion 'determined by' is where we have a range of assignments to the variables. Suppose for example that n = 3 and the relevant assignments
Within this range, x 3 is determined by x 1 , because there is a function yielding x 3 in terms of x 1 . But x 2 is not determined by x 1 and x 3 , because the values x 1 = 1 and x 3 = 3 allow x 2 to be either 2 or 4.
So accordingly we define when a formula is satisfied, not by an assignment to its variables, but to a set X of assignments.
More formally, if X is a set of assignments of elements of the structure M to the variables in the terms t 1 , . . . , t n , then X satisfies the formula =(t 1 , . . . , t n ) in M if and only if there is a function f such that for each assignment s in X ,
If φ(x 1 , . . . , x n ) is a formula with no dependence formulas in it, then X satisfies φ in M if and only if every assignment in X satisfies φ in M in the usual sense.
Syntax and semantics
We allow arbitrary vocabularies, containing relation, constant and function symbols. Terms are built up from variable, constant and function symbols in the ordinary way.
Definition 1.
A formula of D has one of the following forms:
. . , t n are terms, R is a relation symbol, φ and ψ are formulas of D, and x is a variable.
For the definition of semantics 1 we consider a structure M and assignments s mapping some variables to elements of the
As special cases we define
The formula =(t 1 , . . . , t n−1 , t n ) is a kind of De Morgan dual of =(t 1 , . . . , t n−1 , t n ), got by changing disjunctions to conjunctions and by interchanging identities and non-identities. So:
. This amounts to the condition X = ∅. One may wonder why introduce =(t 1 , . . . , t n , t) at all. The answer will emerge later. An immediate consequence of the definition is
We illustrate with the formula ∃y(=(x 1 , . . . , x n , y) ∧ φ) from (10): where s means the restriction of s to (at most) the variables x 1 , . . . , x n . For comparison, the trump semantics for IF-logic [8] yields the following semantics in backslash-logic: These are clearly the same condition on M, X and φ, so the equivalence (10) above holds. The equivalence (9) can be checked likewise:
Proposition 3. The following conditions are equivalent:
For s ∈ X letš extends byš(x n ) = t M n s . Let Z be the set ofš, where s ∈ X . Now M | Z (x n = t n ) and the mappings →š satisfies, by assumption (a), the uniformity condition thatš(x n ) is a function of (s(x 1 ), . . . ,s(x n−1 )), whens ∈ Y . For the converse, suppose
Hence as we anticipated in Section 2:
Every D-sentence is definable in existential second order logic, (17) that is, it is possible to associate every D-sentence φ with a first order sentence Φ(R) with a new predicate symbol R such that the following are equivalent for all models M:
On the other hand, it follows from [3, 17] that the converse is true Every existential second order sentence is definable in D,
that is, we can associate every first order sentence Φ(R) with an D-sentence φ without R such that the above It also follows from this that in infinite models D is closed under infinite recursive conjunctions (see Corollary 10), indicating the subtle infinitary nature of D.
Game-theoretic semantics for D
An equivalent game-theoretic definition for the semantics of D is given below. This game appears to be a perfect information game. However, we are only interested in the question whether the second player has what we call a uniform winning strategy. The effect of the uniformity constraint is that the game becomes actually a game of imperfect information. The only way player II can win with a uniform winning strategy is that she bases her strategy on information that is in game theory appropriately called imperfect. Proof. This is as in [8] . Consider the following strategy of player II: She keeps pointing to a set X (in the beginning she points to X = {∅}) such that after every move of the game:
is the pair she holds and she points to X , then s ∈ X and M | X φ. Let us check that II can actually follow this strategy and win. In the beginning M | {∅} φ, so ( ) holds. she knows where to point to maintain condition ( ). We claim that the strategy is uniform. Suppose s and s are assignments arising from the game when II plays her winning strategy and the game ends in the same dependence formula =(t 1 , . . . , t n−1 , t n ). It is easy to prove that the set X that II points to is uniquely determined by her strategy. Suppose s and s agree about the values of t 1 , . . . , t n−1 . Since M | X =(t 1 , . . . , t n−1 , t n ) and s, s ∈ X , it follows that s and s agree about the value of t n . This strategy gives one direction of the theorem.
For the other direction, suppose player II has a uniform winning strategy τ in the semantic game starting from (φ, ∅). Let X φ be the set of s such that II has held (φ , s) in some play where she followed τ . We show by induction on the length of subformulas φ of φ that M | X φ φ .
(a) Suppose φ is t 1 = t 2 , R(t 1 , . . . , t n ), t 1 = t 2 , or ¬R(t 1 , . . . , t n ). In this case M | s φ for s ∈ X ψ holds by definition. (b) Suppose φ is =(t 1 , . . . , t n−1 , t n ). Suppose s and s are in X φ and agree about the values of t 1 , . . . , t n−1 . Since τ is uniform, s and s agree also about the value of t n . Thus M | X φ =(t 1 , . . .
An equivalent game-theoretic definition using a determined game of perfect information can be easily devised along the lines of [15] .
An algebraic truth definition
Alternatively, the truth definition can be given algebraically, emphasizing the compositionality of our semantics. Let us first recall the algebraic representation of the semantics of first order logic: If t is a term, let var(t) denote the set of n for which the variable x n occurs in t. 
and then for first order φ:
For D the algebraic definition is remarkably similar, but involves the power-set operation:
Definition 7. The truth value [[ φ]]
M of a formula φ in M can be defined as follows:
It is obvious that
Below we identify an element (a 0 , . . . , a n ) of M n+1 with the function (x 0 , . . . , x n ) → (a 0 , . . . , a n ). Moreover, we let
•
There is a perfect symmetry between disjunction and conjunction on the one hand, and existential and universal quantifiers on the other hand, just as in the first order case. If φ happens to be first order (i.e. does not contain subformulas of the form =(t 1 , . . . , t n ) or of the form =(t 1 , . . . , t n )), then [ 
In this sense the semantics of D is a conservative extension of the semantics of first order logic. The definition of [[ φ] ] M also demonstrates the compositionality of D.
Definability of truth
Some systems can define their own truth, see e.g. [13] . Since D is able to express all existential second order sentences, it is in principle clear that it, too, can express its own truth definition, as is pointed out in [5] and proved in [6, Appendix] . On the basis of the inductive truth definition of D it is possible to write down the truth definition explicitly in D. For this end, let us work in a model M which has enough coding to code the basic syntactic concepts as well as all assignments by elements of the model. Let us denote the Gödel number of φ by φ . We denote the term denoting the natural number n in our model by n. Let ∅ be the term denoting the singleton set of the empty assignment. We construct a sentence θ (P) in D with a new binary predicate symbol P, and a formula Θ(x) in D such that: Theorem 9. The following conditions are equivalent for all sentences φ of D:
As in [11] , we get
Corollary 10. D is closed under recursive conjunctions in infinite models.
Clearly, D is not closed under recursive disjunctions: the disjunction of the sentences ''P contains at most n elements", n = 1, 2, . . ., would lead to a contradiction with the Compactness Theorem of D.
For the proof of Theorem 9, we introduce some notation, following [1] . Let Vł(t, x 1 ) denote the value of a term t in M under the assignment coded by x 1 . Let E(x 1 , x 2 , x 3 ) code the assignment s[a : n], where s is the assignment coded by x 1 , n is the value of x 2 , and a is the value of x 3 . Definition 11. Let θ (x 0 , x 1 , x 2 ) be the conjunction of the following formulas with free variables x 0 , x 1 , and x 2 , and the binary predicate symbol P:
(a) Either x 0 is not the Gödel number of an identity of two terms t and t , or ¬P(x 0 , x 1 ) or the terms t and t have the same value under the assignment x 1 .
(b) Either x 0 is not the Gödel number of a negated identity of two terms t and t , or ¬P(x 0 , x 1 ) or the terms t and t have different value under the assignment x 1 .
(c) Either x 0 is not the Gödel number of an atomic formula P(t 1 , . . . , t n ) of terms t 1 , . . . , t n , or ¬P(x 0 , x 1 ) or the terms values of the terms t 1 , . . . , t n under the assignment x 1 satisfy the predicate P. (d) Either x 0 is not the Gödel number of a negated atomic formula ¬P(t 1 , . . . , t n ) of terms t 1 , . . . , t n , or ¬P(x 0 , x 1 ) or the values of the terms t 1 , . . . , t n under the assignment x 1 fail to satisfy the predicate P. (e) Either x 0 is not the Gödel number of a dependence formula =(t 1 , . . . , t n ) of terms t 1 , . . . , t n , or ¬P(x 0 , x 1 ) or =(Vł (t 1 , x 1 ) , . . . ,Vł(t n , x 1 )). (f) Either x 0 is not the Gödel number φ ∧ ψ of a conjunction, or ¬P(x 0 , x 1 ) or (P( φ , x 1 ) and P( ψ , x 1 )). (g) Either x 0 is not the Gödel number φ ∨ ψ of a disjunction, or ¬P(x 0 , x 1 ) or P( φ , x 1 ) or P( ψ , x 1 ). (h) Either x 2 is not a natural number, or x 0 is not ∀zφ , where z is the variable number x 2 , or ¬P(
is not a natural number, or x 0 is not ∃zφ , where z is the variable number x 2 , or ¬P(x 0 , x 1 ), or ∃x 3 P( φ , E(x 1 , x 2 , x 3 )). Let θ(P) be the formula ∀x 0 ∀x 1 ∀x 2 θ (x 0 , x 1 , x 2 ). 
We show that (M, S) | ∅ θ . Let W the set of all assignments s interpreting x 0 and x 1 in M. Because of the first four conjuncts of (27) there are functions E u and E x 2 on W such that if s ∈ X , then
The fifth conjunct of (27) shows Z ⊆ Z 0 ∪ Z 1 , where M | Z 0 u = 1 and M | Z 1 = (f (x 0 , x 1 ), g(x 0 , x 1 ) ). Let W 0 consist of all s ∈ W with some extensions ∈ Z 0 , and W 1 = W \ W 0 . If s ∈ W 0 with an extensions ∈ Z 0 , thens(u) = 1, whence ¬S (s(x 0 ), s(x 1 )) . If s, s ∈ W 1 , and the extensionss,s ∈ Z are chosen arbitrarily (e.g.s(y 0 ) =s(y 1 ) =s(u) =s (y 0 ) = s (y 1 ) =s (u) = 1), thens,s ∈ Z 1 . This implies M | W 1 = (f (x 0 , x 1 ), g(x 0 , x 1 ) ). We have proved that W satisfies the first conjunct of θ .
We next prove that W satisfies the second conjunct of
Let W 2 consist of all s ∈ W with some extension s ∈ Z 2 , and
, and a 2 = G(s)(x 2 ). Let us consider the following two assignments in X :
As a 2 ) , and s 2 (u) = 1. This implies S(a 0 , a 1 ). We have proved that W satisfies the second conjunct of θ .
The last conjunct of (27) shows that (M, S) | {∅} P(n, ∅).
Dependence in English
There are a number of English phrases which allow definite noun phrases, but seem to yield nonsense if the definite noun phrases are read as names of individual objects. For example: All these five examples allow interpretation along the following lines. A family X of paired assignments (a, b) (with a assigned to x and b assigned to y) is given, and the phrase expresses some property of X which cannot be paraphrased as a property of any single pair (a, b) in X . We call an interpretation of this kind a family interpretation.
Three questions arise at once. First, what property of X is expressed? Second, how is X determined? Third, given X , how do these phrases express properties of X , given that a typical English sentence 'x does such-and-such to y' expresses a property of a single x and a single y?
What property of X ?
There is an easy answer in case (a): x is determined by y if and only if for any two pairs (a 1 ,
In case (e) we nearly have the opposite answer: for any two pairs (a 1 , b 1 ) and (a 2 , b 2 ) in X , if b 1 = b 2 then a 1 = a 2 . If this were exactly true then we would expect (e) to have the paraphrase y is determined by x and vice versa. In practice this is not how the phrases are used. There seems to be a causal implication; in case (a) the implication is that the choice of second coordinate acts so as to decide the first coordinate, and in case (e) the implication is that a change in the second coordinate causes a change in the first. Examples from google.com (the poor man's corpus) are (For (a)) Hip bone density is determined by teenage exercise patterns. (For (e)) Pet insurance varies with breed of dog.
To be sure of avoiding any causal implications, we probably need to take mathematical examples; but then we are in danger of leaving ordinary English usage behind.
The usage of (b) is harder to pin down. Mathematicians often assume that it means what we said (a) means, in other words that for some function f , X is the set of all pairs of the form (f (b), b). But sometimes this is clearly not so. One we found on google.com some years ago was:
The quality of your essay is a function of the work you put into it.
The clear implication here is that you can improve your essay by putting in more work; this looks more like (e), and it would certainly be false if the quality was a constant function of the work! It's not entirely clear here whether the speaker means to rule out that other factors might be relevant too, because the class X is not spelt out. For example the implied class might be the class of all possible pairs (the quality of your essay, how hard you try to improve your essay) on the assumption that other factors are kept constant. There is also a Gricean factor. Someone who tells you (b) would presumably have said so if x was determined by something less than y. The same applies to (a). This Gricean implication goes some way towards (e), but easy examples show that it is weaker than (e).
(c) is perhaps closer to the Gricean implication of (b). A typical use of (c) is where we have a bundle of factors, and y describes the values of some of them. In this case (c) expresses that x is not determined by any set of factors unless the set contains all the factors reported in y. So here we have an extra multiplicity: not just the family X , but a set of factors, some of which are involved in X . An example from google.com is Your security depends on your workers' habits.
(d) seems to be a negation of (c); for example 'Your security is independent of your workers' habits' (in other words, it is entirely determined by other factors).
How is X given?
There is probably nothing useful that we can say here about the cases where X is given by the context of utterance. More important for us are the cases where no X seems to be given, even though one is needed for the interpretation.
Here is one of several similar examples in the books of Serge Lang [12] :
Let 0 < a ≤ 1, and m an integer with |m| ≥ 2. Let s = σ + iT m with −a ≤ σ ≤ 1 + a and T m as above. Then
where b is a number depending on a but not on m and σ .
Never mind that this is heavily mathematical; students seem to have no trouble understanding the idiom without needing to have it explained to them. (One of us used this same example on page 545 of [8] to make the point that IF-like phenomena do occur quite naturally in mathematical writing. Here we make the further point that Lang's text is closer to the dependenceof-variables formulation of the present paper than it is to slashed quantifiers. There are at least two ways to read this example. Perhaps more work and a wider range of examples are needed to decide which if either of them is right.
(A) The first reading is that Lang means that b is determined by a, but he does not intend this X as the relevant family. Rather his sentence means that there is a family X such that certain things hold, and within this family b is determined by a. This reading will probably appeal to mathematicians who detect a function quantifier hidden under Lang's text. (B) The second reading is that we got the right family X , but Lang is not saying anything about functional dependence.
Rather he is saying first that for every choice of a, m and σ there is a b with (a, m, σ , b) in X (this is his first clause), and second that given a, m and σ we can choose the b without making any use of m and σ , but there is no b that works for all a.
If we try to build up a formal semantics for the relevant fragment of English, (B) will probably be easier to handle than (A), because (A) involves an existential quantification over sets.
How to shift from individuals to families?
There is a much-quoted paper of Barbara Partee [14] which helps us here. She describes some ways in which noun phrases can come to have interpretations not of type e (individuals) but of type e, t (functions from individuals to truth values, i.e. predicates), or even of type e, t , t (predicates of predicates). For example the noun phrase 'an introvert' can stand for an individual introvert; but in the context Mary considers John an introvert. the verb 'considers' has the effect of raising the type of 'an introvert' from e to e, t , so that it operates as a predicate. (This is an oversimplified version of one of her remarks.)
Our phrases seem to demand something similar, though not exactly any of the devices that Partee mentions. We need to say, for Lang's example above, that the word 'depending' has the effect of creating a semantic component of type e, e, e, e, t , i.e. a property of 4-tuples. Note that the first part of Lang's sentence, up to but excluding the word 'where', has a conventional semantics that does not require any higher-type object like the component we have just proposed. Nevertheless this first part contains all the raw materials used to construct the component. It seems that this type raising occurs after the first processing of the first part of the sentence. Partee makes the point that facts at a low type level can be translated into facts at a higher level, and in this case there is no problem about recasting Lang's first clause so that it involves the higher type component.
Dependence logic does something similar to what we have just described. Sentences of dependence logic with no occurrences of =(. . .) or =(. . .) can be interpreted exactly as ordinary first-order sentences; but there is a uniform paraphrase of the first-order interpretation in terms of sets of assignments. When a =(. . .) appears, it forces the interpretation into the higher-type form, using sets of assignments.
